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THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
BY WILLIAM COHEN*
OR legal purposes, the distinctions between public and private
schools are much less significant than would appear. To under-
stand this, it is necessary to consider the problem of student legal
rights in its historical context. Some decades ago, the problem in
both public and private institutions was treated largely as that of
insuring the student some protection against arbitrary institutional
action which affected his justifiable expectations. If the student had
completed all the requisites for the degree, and the school had taken
his time and money, then it ought to be precluded from arbitrary
action denying him his degree. At some point, the actions of institu-
tions could become arbitrary enough that the courts would step in.
But it is clear that what was to be protected was the student's justifi-
able and reasonable expectations based upon what was, to a large
extent, an economic investment.
That approach was reflected in the related field of constitu-
tional law. Two cases, for example, now interpreted as milestones
of academic freedom, Meyer v. Nebraska' and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,' protected the right to maintain private schools and the right
of private schools to maintain some control over curriculum free of
state interference. Those cases were not decided on the basis of the
first amendment, as they might be today. Their rationale was the
protection of economic rights of private schools. They were decided
as a part of the pattern of cases protecting all kinds of economic
rights under the due process and equal protection clauses. Given
that view of constitutional law by the United States Supreme Court,
it is not surprising that the approach to the rights of students by
state courts would be similar- protecting a student's reasonable
expectations after he had made an investment and had not received
what he had bargained for.
The obvious legal concept to invoke in order to protect economic
expectation is contract. For that reason, the cases involving student
rights in both public and private institutions talked and thought
about the problem in terms of contract concepts. However, courts
did not apply the contract concept as they would in other cases.
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They were ready to protect a student's justifiable expectations at
some point, but competing considerations made courts reluctant to
interfere with institutional decisions.
Obviously, the view of the role of the institution to the student
as one of paternalism left little room for legal interference. There
was, moreover, a fear of interference with institutional autonomy
and institutional judgments in areas where courts doubted their own
competence to second-guess supposedly expert school administrators.
A third important factor regarding both public and private schools
was the concept of privilege. Public education was a privilege that
the state could give or withhold on its own terms. In 1934, the
Supreme Court decided that a state university could insist that
a conscientious objector take military training, because his alterna-
tive was not to go to the state university.' A similar concept ex-
isted at the private level. A private school was an institution with
which the student could deal or not as he chose. The legal concept,
that education was a privilege that had to be taken on the terms the
school imposed, was the same for private and public schools.
The important point to be emphasized is that, until recently, the
courts perceived almost no difference in their treatment of public
and private schools. In both cases, judicial interference was nearly
nonexistent. In both public and private schools, student rights - at
least in terms of rights protectable in court - were minimal. While
a few cases could be cited of judicial veto of extreme institutional
decisions to expel students late in their careers, student rights did
not loom large.
What has happened to change all of this? To a large extent,
cases from the South, initially involving racial policies of public
schools, have been the source of pressure for change. Through the
racial cases, the precedent of judicial interference with some decisions
by public schools has been established. The result has been increas-
ing recognition of the rights of students in public schools in cases
where no racial policy was at stake. Greater judicial involvement
with the public school necessarily will mean greater judicial involve-
ment with the private school. The reasons for rejection of the earlier
policy of noninterference with reference to public institutions are
exactly the reasons why courts will be less reluctant to interfere with
similar judgments by private institutions.
Does this mean that there are no differences between public
and private schools? It is tempting to say "there is no such thing as
a private school," and turn to the hard questions of fairness to stu-
dents and appropriate school policy. However, that would be an
oversimplification. The point is not that there are no differences
3 Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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between public and private schools, but that among the differences
between institutions, the public-private distinction is the least impor-
tant, or one of the least important, distinctions.
Functionally, there is more similarity between the University of
California and Harvard than there is between the University of
California and a small, residential, state-run teachers college located
in a rural area. The same is true of private schools. There is more
difference between Harvard and a small theological seminary than
there is between Harvard and the University of California. But the
content of rules that should be applied, both with reference to stu-
dent substantive rights and student procedural rights, must take into
account institutional differences. That is obviously true in terms of
their legal aspects as well as their nonlegal aspects. The content of
those rules, however, is not within the scope of this article. But in
framing those rules, many of the most important institutional differ-
ences will involve only incidentally the private-public distinction.
Both private and public schools may be residential or commuter col-
leges. Both may be either large, general institutions of higher learning
or special purpose institutions.
The remainder of this article will be concerned with the legal
theories by which private educational institutions' decisions concern-
ing student rights may be subjected to judicial control. These theories
fall into two categories. First is the concept of state action, by which
a private school may be subjected to some of the same minimal con-
stitutional restrictions as a public school. Second is a group of com-
mon law theories by which state courts might subject a private school
to legal norms, whether or not those schools are subjected to con-
stitutional limitations. However, a caveat at this point is appropriate.
The theories by which public and private institutions are subjected
to judicial control may differ. It is easy, however, to overemphasize
the importance of the legal theories involved. For example, even if
the relevant theory for protecting student rights were contract, it
would be possible for a sensitive court to evolve sensible rules about
private institutions under a contract theory - particularly if the
contract were treated as one of adhesion and the court retained the
power to disregard any terms of the contract it determined to be in-
appropriate. A court which had made appropriate judgments about
the extent of judicial involvement could utilize the contract theory
and solve most student-institution problems correctly. On the other
hand, the contract theory could lead to inappropriate results in the
hands of an insensitive court. A substantial number of courts have
read general language in university catalogs as a blanket waiver of
a student's substantive and procedural rights. Probably, these same
courts would not so broadly construe a waiver of rights written on a
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ticket that a student received in parking his car in a commercial park-
ing lot.
It is dangerous to assume that the development of legal theories
is the major problem, because the real problem is determining the
extent of legal control that is desirable and appropriate in a par-
ticular situation. That question is independent of the legal theory
invoked. With this in mind, a brief survey of the legal theories can
be considered.
The most obvious theory for developing legal control of private
institutions is the theory of state action - that some institutions
which are apparently private are actually public, and therefore sub-
ject to some restrictions imposed by the Constitution. The large
private institutions of learning carry with them most of the indicia
of state action for application of constitutional controls that have
been found in the cases involving public universities. On the other
hand, it should be remembered that no United States Supreme Court
decision, except in the racial context, has decided that the Constitu-
tion applies significant control over private educational institutions.
The most obvious of the indicia of state action, of course, is
public funding of nominally "private" schools. It will be increasingly
difficult to draw the distinction between "public" and "private"
schools in terms of who is funding them. Further, formal state regula-
tion and involvement varies in intensity and in kind from situation to
situation. The developing theory is that institutions which perform a
public function become public for some constitutional purposes,
without reference to the extent of formal state involvement. The
latest case to apply that theory involved a municipal park.4 Justice
Douglas' opinion for the court argued that city maintenance of a
segregated park was so much a governmental function that the park
might be public for fourteenth amendment purposes, no matter who
was in formal control. Justice Douglas distinguished the problem of
private schools as perhaps being different,5 but it is significant that
Justice Harlan's dissent argued that, under the Court's view of the
public function theory, it would be impossible to say that any school
is a private school.'
Before examining some common law bases for judicial control
of private schools, another disclaimer is in order. One difficulty with
the state action theory is that some have viewed it as an oversimpli-
fied syllogism which goes something like this - due to state involve-
ment, a private school is the state, and therefore cannot do anything
that the state could not do. In my opinion, that view is clearly erro-
4 Evas v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
5 Id. at 300.
6Id. at 321-22.
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neous. State action may be more of a scalpel than a club. For ex-
ample, significant state involvement in Catholic schools may give
some constitutional rights to students in those schools. If most of the
money for student tuition in a Catholic college comes from federal
and state funds, some admission policies at that college would come
under constitutional scrutiny. It would not follow that the Catholic
college would be bound by the establishment principles of the first
amendment so as to lose its right to give religious instruction.
In summary, the question of state action is more than the tech-
nical issue of sufficient governmental involvement which would
treat all decisions of a "private" institution as a governmental de-
cision. The question will be partly determined by the merits of the
issues involved. It has not been surprising, given the clear applica-
tion of the equal protection clause to the arbitrary exclusion of
students on racial grounds, that in such cases federal courts have
extended the reach of the fourteenth amendment even to institutions
lightly involved with government. It would not follow that an in-
stitution more heavily involved with government would be precluded
from using private funds to construct a chapel on the campus. The
nature of the question involved gives different judicial perspectives
to the state action question.
The Constitution is not the sole source for legal controls over
private educational institutions. State courts, applying state common
law doctrines, may set some significant limits on unfair treatment
of students by private schools. Thus, in enlightened states, it may
not be necessary to invoke the Constitution to provide a legal base
for the protection of student rights in private institutions. As men-
tioned above, it is possible and appropriate for a court to develop
some kinds of contract theories which, if expansively handled, could
be used to provide significant legal protection for students. Professor
Seavey has suggested a theory that the institution is a trustee acting
in a fiduciary capacity to the student.7 WXhile I have some trouble
with the concept, it is a legal theory that could be invoked, although
no court has used it. Another possible theory that has not been ap-
plied to a private school might borrow on tort principles. The rights
of people in other private associations have been protected by some
courts under the theory of prima facie tort. It has been used, for
example, where a member is excluded from a labor union for arbi-
trary reasons with a loss of his economic rights. Proceeding from
the theory that deliberate destruction of valuable economic rights is
actionable unless justified, it is possible to work out a theory that the
student's separation from the institution, or his loss of substantial
rights, represents tortious conduct unless justified. What the institu-
7 Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406 (1957).
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tion can and cannot do would then be determined through definition
of the scope of the privileges. However, one obstacle to utilization
of this theory may be the immunity in some states of charitable insti-
tutions from liability in tort.
In conclusion, it is apparent that the court that has decided to
impose legal controls upon what an institution may or may not do
with reference to its students has an armory of legal theories at its
disposal. The theories are interesting arguing points for lawyers.
But, as law in this area begins to develop, defining the theories will
be much less important than defining the legal restrictions that are
appropriate for various kinds of institutions. School administrators
should begin to think in functional terms rather than in terms of
legal concepts. Rules that have been developed for some institutions
are not appropriate for others. If the specialized function, size, or
location of a school requires a different kind of approach, the de-
velopment of sensible rules in advance will make it less likely that
the institution will have to live with inappropriate rules imposed by
a court.
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